Data Sources and Variable Construction
In this section, we provide additional information on our data sources and the construction of variables.
1.1 Data for Individual-Level Analyses (National Election Studies)
Non-income variable descriptions
In Table 1 , we provide descriptions for the non-income variables used in the national-electionstudy analyses. Table 1 : Descriptions of non-income variables used in the various national election study analyses.
Variable Label
Description Source V oteIncumbent i,e Binary variable coded to 1 for a respondent indicating they voted for the party of the incumbent prime minister, and 0 otherwise.
Various election surveys.
P roP artyID i,e 7-point scale (from -1 to 1) for the U.S. and a binary variable for the other countries coded to 1 for a respondent indicating they identify most closely with the party of the incumbent prime minister, and 0 otherwise.
T enure i,e Years the party of the incumbent prime minister has held the post.
Calculated from Döring and Manow (2012) .
Details of national election studies United States
For the U.S. we use the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File, which combines data from every study in that time series. The file includes all variables repeated and measured reasonably consistently over the years. The ANES time series studies are based on face-to-face interviews with national probability samples, although some years include over-samples of particular demographic groups. Where necessary, we account for these design-based departures from random sampling using sampling weights provided in the data file. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
Canada
Our survey data for Canada largely derive from a data file, prepared by Richard Johnston at the University of British Columbia, that contains data for selected variables from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) from 1965 to 2011. This file excludes the 1972 study, which we have added to the file ourselves. (An excerpt of Johnston's file containing only those variables used in the paper, and supplemented with data for 1972, can be obtained from the Dataverse page for this paper.) Canadian election surveys were generally face-to-face prior to 1988, whereupon the primary survey mode switched to telephone interviewing. Whenever possible, we rely on face-to-face interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample, but excluded the Yukon, the North West Territories and Nunavut.
For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of respondents. At times, however, we must rely partly or entirely on members of multi-election panels (e.g., the 1974-1979-1980 panel) . In general, these panels have been "topped up" at each successive wave of interviews with fresh respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates. Where necessary, we account for design-based departures from random sampling -owing, for instance, to oversampling of certain demographic groups in some surveys -through the use of sampling weights supplied by study investigators. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
Sweden
Data from the Swedish Election Study were obtained from the Swedish National Data Service.
The Swedish election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys throughout the sample period and, whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately following Election Day.
Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample. Since 1973, the Swedish surveys have been designed as "rolling two-stage panels," whereby one-half of the sample at a given election is a fresh cross-section to be interviewed in the present and in the subsequent election, and one-half of the sample are members of a panel initiated at the previous election. For the analyses in the present paper, we exclude all panelists' second-wave interviews. Design weights are not available, so we simply reweight each election sample so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
UK
Data from the British Election Study were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and, for more recent years, from the British Election Study. The British election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys throughout the sample period. Whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample, but the studies generally exclude Northern Ireland. 1 For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of respondents, although we must rely on members of a multi-election panel for the 1963-1964-1966 election sequence. These panels were "topped up" at each successive wave of interviews with fresh respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates.
The 1964 and 1966 BES samples include sampling weights designed to correct for panel attrition and mortality, which we utilize in our analyses. More generally, we account for design-based departures from random sampling -owing, for instance, to oversampling of certain demographic groups in some surveys -through the use of sampling weights supplied by study investigators.
Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
Income measures
In Table 2 , we detail how we measure mean, top, lower, and middle-income growth rates in the analyses reported in the main text, indicating the precise income concepts and statistics used.
Data sources are documented in the table's footnotes. The statistics correspond to notations defined in Table 2 in the main text.
1 Separate Northern Irish studies have been conducted in some years. 9 Calculated from data in annual editions of Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled "Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass" ("Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income"). We calculate the mean income of all earners from the columns "Number of income earners: Total" and "Total income: Total." Nominal income values deflated by CPI found at http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/ Prices-and-Consumption/Consumer-Price-Index/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/Aktuell-Pong/33779/ Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/33895/.
10 Calculated as mean of decile means from Statistika centralbyrån (SCB) dataset, -07-17, "Disposable Income, 1975 -2011 [2013]", http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version] . We use Excel file, "Disposable Income by deciles, 1975 deciles, -2011 11 WTID, Canada, "Average Income per Tax Unit" Series. 12 We have calculated the mean of the five quintile average incomes from Statistics Canada. We have everywhere preferred measures of disposable or after-tax income over other income concepts. We have also sought to use income-group means, where possible, rather than quantile thresholds. We resort to alternative measures, however, where constrained by data availability or quality. We explain below deviations from these preferred measures.
U.S.
In the U.S., historical data on the incomes of income quantiles are available only for total (pre-tax) income. This is therefore the income concept that L. M. Bartels (2008) uses, and that we use as well. However, we depart from Bartels' measures in two ways.
First, Bartels measures mean income growth as mean disposable personal income. To bring the mean income measure into closer alignment with the quantile-income measures, we instead construct a measure of mean total family income, based on BEA measures of personal income and Census data on the number of families. Unlike Bartels, we thus use the same income concept -per-family total income -both for mean growth and for quantile growth (top 5%, Q1 and Q3).
Second, Bartels uses measures of growth in income thresholds as his measures of growth for the top 5% and in the quintiles. To better capture the distribution of income gains between groups, we instead use measures of growth in the mean income of the top 5% and of the mean income of bottom and middle quintiles. We lose four elections by making this switch, as the U.S. quantile-mean data series does not go back as far as the threshold series. Nevertheless, we see the gain in the fit between measure and concept as worth this loss, and the broad inferences do not meaningfully change, even with the reduced sample. We also show results based on threshold eng&id=2020701.
17 Drawn from Census Historical Income 
Canada
Income concept: We use after-tax income measures for Canada where available. As Statscan's after-tax income series only goes back to 1983 (for top incomes) and 1977 (for mean and quintiles), we substitute WTID measures of top and mean pre-tax incomes for earlier years. In our secondary specifications (for low-and middle-income voters), we also limit the sample to the post-1977 period as we lack quintile-income measures for earlier years.
This implies a shift from pre-tax incomes for the earlier period (as the WTID measures are all pre-tax) to after-tax incomes for the later period. However, we show in Figures 1 and 2 , below, that WTID measures of mean and top-5% pre-tax income growth line up well against Statscan's after-tax measures where these two series overlap.
Further below in the Supplementary Material, we also show results for analyses that use only growth in after-tax incomes of the relevant income groups (which means limiting ourselves to the post-1982 period). As with the results reported in the main text, we observe only indifference to inequality, and not demand for inequality. Thus, the use of pre-tax data from the WTID does not appear to be affecting our inferences.
Thresholds vs. means: Throughout, we measure growth in the mean incomes of the relevant income groups.
United Kingdom
All British income measures are measures of disposable household income. The data come from the spreadsheet entitled "Inequality and Poverty Spreadsheet" that accompanies the Institute for Fiscal Studies report (Cribb et al., 2013) . We focus on the "before housing costs" series for consistency with the other countries studied here. The underlying data for the spreadsheet are drawn from the government's Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
As no data are available for the mean incomes of British income groups, we are forced to measure growth in thresholds for bottom and middle quantiles and for the 95th percentile. 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year
StatCan WTID Mean income growth rates 1 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Abstracts. These data refer to total taxable, before-tax incomes of earners, the only incomedistribution measure available for this period. period. To better capture distributional dynamics between income groups, our preference would have been to use this series. However, these data appear to be extremely unreliable. Statistics Sweden reports margins of error for its income-distribution data, and indicates a very large MoE for the measure of the mean incomes of the top 5% -indeed, so large that it would swamp actual growth rates. We demonstrate the problem with plots of both the error estimates and the series itself (against alternative top-income-growth measures) in Figures 3 and 4 ; the extreme volatility of this measure is readily apparent. We suspect that the reason for the high volatility of this series is that it derives from a survey-based measure and is probably highly affected by fluctuations in the composition of the sample at the very top end of the income scale, where changes will disproportionately affect the mean.
In contrast, Statistics Sweden's P95 threshold measure, also displayed in Figures 3 and 4 , is much more stable and precise. This is unsurprising, given that a threshold measure will be less affected by survey-sampling variability at the very top (i.e., by the number of very rich households sampled). Thus, for analyses in the main paper, for the post-1980 period, we use Statistics Sweden's P95 measures, rather than their measures of the mean income of the top 5%. Figure 3 : Sweden: top income growth rates from various sources.
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We also note some volatility in Statistics Sweden's measure of aggregate mean after-tax income (see Figure 5 ). We thus wanted to be sure that noise in this measure was not biasing our results toward a CBEV effect (away from a standard mean-economic-voting effect). In Table 20 below, we show models using an alternative set of measures drawn from the WTID. The models displayed here use a measure of the mean (pre-tax) income of the top-5% for the entire period, drawn from the WTID's Sweden series. As seen in Figure 3 , the WTID mean-top-5% measure tracks the SCB's P95 measure quite closely. The models in Table 20 also use WTID's measure of aggregate mean-income, in lieu of Statistics Sweden's measure. As can be seen, the basic inferences do not change significantly with the use of these WTID measures, with a quite clear demand-forinequality emerging here as for the models in the main paper.
We also show in Table 21 1 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year SCB WTID Mean income growth rates
Estimating Income Levels From Swedish Income Distribution Data
For earlier parts of our sample periods for Sweden, direct measures of income levels for the income quantiles of interest to us (i.e. the various quintiles and the 95th percentile) are not available.
Therefore, for our income series for Sweden, we must combine data on annual income levels for the income quantiles of interest from two sources. Statistics Sweden (SCB) provides quintile and 95th percentile disposable income levels from 1975 onwards. For years prior to this, we use distributional data from Sweden Statistical Abstracts (see Income Sources table) , and then estimate the income levels relevant to our analysis. These distributional data come in the form of income bands that indicate the upper and lower bounds of each band, as well as the percentage of the population that falls within each band.
21
To calculate the income levels that are of interest to us, we use the following algorithm:
1. Find the income band that contains the income quantile we are interested in.
2. Calculate the proportion (p) of people in the band that, when added to all the people in the lower bands, would form the cut-off for our income quantile of interest. We then deflate these nominal income levels, using Swedish CPI data, to obtain real income levels. As the SCB and our interpolated income series do not match perfectly in terms of underlying methodology, we first calculate the growth rates for the two income series, and then merge the two to yield variables that cover the period 1954-2010 -where preference is given to the Statistics Sweden data rather than our yearbook-derived data, when we have both available.
21 In some cases, we must calculate the percentage from the raw numbers of people in each band.
1.2 Aggregate-Level TSCS Analyses: Data Table 3 provides details on the sample used in the aggregate-level, TSCS (15-country) analyses presented in the paper. Table 4 provides variable descriptions for our aggregate-level TSCS analyses.
In constructing top-income, mean-income, and top-share measures from WTID datasets, the exact country data series employed varies depending on availability. Our rule for measuring the incomes of the top X% is as follows: Vote share of party of the incumbent prime minister Döring and Manow (2012) .
Years the incumbent party of the incumbent prime minister has held the post Calculated from Döring and Manow (2012) .
Growth rate of mean-income, as measured by GDP per capita. Bolt and van Zanden (2013) .
Growth rate of income of the top 'X' percent of the income distribution. Alvarez et al. (2012) .
Share of income of the top 'X' percent of the income distribution. Alvarez et al. (2012) .
OECD statistics portal.
Inf lation i,t
Inflation rate Armingeon et al. (2007) .
Clarity of responsibility index based on Tavits (2007) .
Our rule for measuring mean income is as follows:
6. Use Top X% Income Share, married couples and single adults.
Following Tavits (2007) , Clarity i,t (employed in robustness tests below) is calculated as an index such that:
where EN P i,t denotes the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) , M inority i,t denotes a dummy variable for whether an incumbent government holds only a minority of seats in the lower house, and T enure i,t denotes the years for which the party of the incumbent prime minister has held that post (unininterrupted by anything other than a caretaker government).
The Std(·) function denotes standardization of its argument such that the variable is linearly rescaled to be ∈ [0, 1], with the sample minimum corresponding to 0 and the sample maximum to 1. When constructing her measure of 'clarity of responsibility ', Tavits (2007) also uses data on parliamentary committee structure, but these data are not available for non-trivial portions of our sample period, so we do not include them here.
2 The Specification of Our Empirical Models
Modelling Response to Inequality
The question that we wish to answer in this section is: what is the appropriate specification for our empirical models in order to test for responses to inequality in vote choice and vote share?
To begin, we define:
where G denotes a growth rate, and M and T denote mean and 'top' income, respectively. Thus,
we have defined an inequality metric that is sensitive to differences between a top income group and the remainder of the population. Where top-income growth is the same as mean income growth, there is no change in the relative incomes of the two groups, and so inequality does not change. Where top-income growth is higher (lower) than mean income growth, the income of the top group increases (decrease) relative to the non-top group. As top-income growth is included in mean-income growth, this change in Inequality is larger than it might appear at first because higher-than-mean growth for the top group mechanically implies lower-than-mean growth for the remainder.
With (2) in hand, one natural empirical specification would appear to be:
where V denotes vote share/choice. As (3) shows, this approach provides a direct estimate of the effect of changing inequality via β 2 , whilst controlling for mean-income growth -which we wish to do in order to accord with the prevailing economic voting literature. We simply use (2) to move from (3) to (4) . In doing so, it becomes clear that (3) is not such a desirable specification because it muddies the waters when interpreting the coefficient on mean-growth. Specifically, differentiating (4) with respect to G M t , we get:
Thus, with this specification, while we directly estimate the effect of changes in inequality, we cannot perform inferences on the coefficient on mean-income growth (β 1 ), but must subtract the top-income growth coefficient, first.
Rather than take this slightly cumbersome approach, we use the same specification adopted by L. M. Bartels (2008, Chapter 4) , and estimate equations of the form:
Now, it is easy to see that (6) still yields the same direct estimate of the effect of changing inequality as (3) . We can simply differentiate both (6) and (4) with respect to G T t , which yields:
Furthermore, as noted above, β 2 is also the direct estimate of the effect of changes in Inequality t .
Finally, if we differentiate (6) with respect to G M t , it is apparent that we can perform inferences regarding mean-income growth directly from the estimates for a single parameter in the model (β 1 ):
Controlling for Party Identification
Following L. M. Bartels (2008) , our model of incumbent voting (Model 1; see section 3 of the paper) includes a measure of party identification (P roP artyID). Including the measure controls for confounding between patterns of income growth and the partisan identity of governments, and also increases the precision of our estimates by soaking up individual-level variation in vote choice.
One possible concern with this approach is the possibility that party identification, at least as measured, might mediate the influence of inequality with respect to vote choice. In particular, Growth T op5 in an election year may have a short-run negative impact on P roP artyID, which, in turn, influences vote choice. If so, including P roP artyID in our models might be "masking" a sensible, but indirect, negative effect of inequality on incumbent support.
In this section, we report parameter estimates for models without a control for P roP artyID.
We further consider whether any differences in findings for models with and without this control reflect the mediation of inequality-aversion through party identification or, more simply, a correlation (for other reasons) between patterns of income growth and the partisan complexion of governments. We adduce several pieces of evidence that the positive relationship between inequality and incumbent support in our election-study analyses (captured in the coefficient on Growth T op5 )
does not reflect an anterior, negative relationship between Growth T op5 and P roP artyID.
We begin by reporting the results of models that exclude party identification. The relevant analyses are in Tables 5, 8, 6 , and 7, respectively, for the U.S., Canada, Sweden and the U.K.
Each table contains five models: as in the paper, for each country we estimate the vote model for the whole sample and, in separate estimations, for lower-and middle-income earners, controlling first for mean growth and then for a tercile-specific growth measure. A statistically significant demand for inequality remains in most settings across three countries: in the whole sample and among middle-income earners in the U.S.; in the whole sample and among low-income earners in Sweden; and, among middle-income earners in the U.K. Compared to the models reported in the main paper, excluding party ID only affects basic findings (i.e., brings p-values on Growth
above conventional levels of statistical significance) for two samples: low-income voters in the U.S. and the full electorate in the U.K. We speak below to reasons why we believe that including a control for party identification is appropriate. It is in any case important to note that (a.) the demand-for-inequality results reported in the paper are mostly robust to the exclusion of this control and (b.) under either specification, we see almost no evidence of a "sensible" aversion to inequality, among full electorates or low-and middle-income groups. The Growth T op5 coefficient is negatively signed and statistically significant only among low-income earners in the U.K., and only when controlling for income growth at the bottom rather than mean growth. Any effect of excluding P roP artyID from the models is essentially to increase evidence of indifference to, rather than demand for, inequality.
In sum, under either specification, we find almost no evidence that non-rich voters in the four countries vote to advance their distributive interests at the ballot box. Equally important, the aggregate-level TSCS analyses in the paper yield evidence of CBEV-and, in particular, of a positive demand for inequality-in a much broader OECD context without controlling for party identification.
The paper's substantive findings are thus only modestly affected by the choice about whether to include or exclude party identification in the election-study models. Nonetheless, in the remainder of this section, we address the appropriateness of including this control by considering whether party identification itself appears to be negatively affected by top-income growth in the previous year (and, thus, could potentially be mediating a negative effect of inequality on votes for the incumbent). We point to two key pieces of evidence on this point.
First, we find little indication of a negative correlation between Growth T op5 and P roP artyID. Tables 9, 12 , 11, and 10 present estimates of models of incumbent party identification containing Growth M , Growth T op5 , and log T enure t , first for the whole sample and then separately for lowand middle-income earners. In three of the four countries there is not a hint of a relationshippositive or negative -between top-5-percent income growth and party identification. Only in the U.S., in Table 9 , do we detect a weak (non-statistically-significant) negative relationship. We note, however, that (as discussed above) findings of demand-for-inequality for the full electorate and for middle-income voters are robust to the exclusion of a party ID control.
Second, in models of P roP artyID, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients on Growth T op5
across the four countries are inconsistent with a causal interpretation from the latter to the former, given broader comparative findings on the stability of party identification. Notwithstanding ongoing methodological debate about how best to model the stability of party ID (e.g. B. L. Bartels et al., 2011; Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009) , party identification has been commonly found to be a more stable orientation in the U.S. than in other advanced democracies (LeDuc, 1981 ; see also Schickler and Green, 1997) . We would thus expect party ID in the United States to be less susceptible to influence by short-run economic conditions than party ID elsewhere. Yet the only place where we find a hint of a negative correlation between election-year top-income growth and pro-incumbent party identification is in the United States (see Table 9 ) -precisely where a substantial causal effect on party ID is least plausible. Not only is the correlation between Growth T op5 and P roP artyID in the U.S. weak, but the cross-national pattern of correlations also cuts against the possibility that any such correlation reflects endogeneity of P roP artyID to election-year top-income growth.
In sum, (a.) the choice about the inclusion or exclusion of a party-identification control is only modestly consequential for our conclusions, and (b.) we can find little evidence that its inclusion could plausibly be masking a negative effect of inequality on votes for the incumbent. . Share T 5 moderates the effect of Growth P 95 in the full sample and among middle-income earners. . Here we do not find the same moderating effect of Share T 5 as in the aggregate-level TSCS analysis; indeed there is a moderating effect in the opposite direction. . Share T 5 moderates the effect of Growth T 5M in the full sample and among middle-income earners. . Substituting measures of growth in income percentiles for measures of mean growth within quantiles, which also adds four earlier elections to the analysis, does not affect inferences of a demand for inequality. Quantile threshold data come from Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races), https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls . Growth T 5 t and Growth M t inferences are affected by use of log T enure t as opposed to T enure t , but our decision to use the former in the main text, for consistency with the other country analyses, biases against the inference of a positive effect from Growth . Using solely WTID measures for mean and top-5% ("Top 5% Average Income Per Tax Unit" series) income growth, a clear demand-for-inequality remains in the full sample and among low-income earners.
Moderation of Individual-Level Results by Top-Income Shares
(1) . Substituting Statistics Sweden's highly volatile top-5 mean growth measure for Statistics Sweden's P95 growth rates after 1980 eliminates the demand-for-inequality effect in this case. . Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than a mixture of mean growth of the bottom-40 percent and growth at the 20th percentile, does not affect the inference regarding Growth T 5M . Growth P 20 t is measured using the linear interpolation procedure described in section 1.1.4. . The results in this table speak to the demand-for-inequality results that appear only in our secondary specifications for low-and middle-income voters (as shown in models 3 and 5 in the paper). As the secondary models are estimated on a truncated sample of elections, as compared to our primary models for these voters, the question arises as to whether the difference in results arises from differences in the sample or from differences in the model specification. As we see below, we continue to find indifference to inequality in our primary specification, even when we restrict the sample to that employed for our secondary specification. Moreover, comparing BIC statistics within each pair of models reveals that the best fit -for both low-and middle-income earners -is provided when controlling for mean, rather than tercile-specific, income growth. For this reason, we emphasize the mean-growth specification in the paper (i.e., we conclude that Canadians are indifferent to inequality). Table 30 : TSCS: Alternative "top-income" thresholds. The finding of moderation of the effect of top-income growth is present when we define "top-income" to be that of the top 0.1%; it is not statistically significant for the top 10%, that is, we estimate a significant demand for inequality irrespective of the income share of the top 10%.
Canada
(1) i,t is robust to inclusion of the unemployment rate, as well as the change in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. (1) (2) i,t is robust to the inclusion of a year trend, and also to the inclusion of a measure of 'clarity of responsibility' interacted with Growth M i,t . See notes above for full details of how Clarity i,t is calculated. 
